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The issues raised in this appeal of an action for specific per-
formance of an option are whether parol evidence was admissible to 
show that the consideration stated in the option ("$5,000.00 and other 
good and valuable consideration") was not intended to be paid, and 
whether critical parts of this evidence were inadmissible on other 
grounds as well. 
With regard to the parol evidence question, Respondent's Brief 
asserts, first, that the parol evidence rule does not prevent inquiry 
into the "real" consideration for an agreement which does not contain 
a contractual statement of consideration, and, second, that considera-
tion for the option in this case may be found in the real estate 
contract and certificate of limited partnership with which it is 
"integrated". Respondent apparently disavows any claim that parol was 
admissible in this case to show that the real estate contract and 
option were intended to constitute a loan secured with realty, with a 
right to retrieve the security upon "repaying" the "loan", thus admit-
ting that Respondent did not meet the evidentiary requirements of such 
a claim. 
Apart from the parol evidence question, Respondent claims that 
the option was enforceable because, though the $5,000.00 was never 
paid, "other good and valuable consideration" was given, and, in any 
case, because the option contains an acknowledgment of receipt, appel-
lants are promisorily estopped to assert a lack of consideration. 
Respondent includes a highly partisan "Statement of Facts" which, 
it will be observed, is almost entirely unsupported by Respondents1 
citations to the record. It will also be observed that the bulk of 
these "facts" are parol matters, to which it is unnecessary to respond 
1 
absent some showing that parol was admissible to establish such 
"facts". 
Finally, Respondent defends the District Courtfs reliance on 
certain "notes" and an appraisal. 
Respondents arguments on matters other than the parol evidence 
question can be addressed quickly before turning to the parol question 
and the particular evidentiary questions. 
The Statement of Facts 
Respondent has attempted to predispose reaction to its argument 
by prefacing it with a highly colored "Statement of Facts". The Court 
should be advised that a number of critical "facts" asserted there by 
Respondent are essentially unsupported by the included references to 
the record. Notable examples include the statements that appellants 
"advised Colman that they were only interested in advancing Colman 
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and only on condition that the 
$500,000.00 be structured to appear by written record as (1) an in-
vestment of $250,000.00 in a limited partnership on the salt pro-
ject... and (2) a payment of $250,000.00 as the purchase price for the 
Anderson Ranch, coupled with ei one-year option in Colman" (p. 3, 
Respondent's Brief), that "Allen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and 
Colman that, although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to 
get $500,000.00 to Colman... they wanted the deal structured such that 
it would appear as three separate transactions (i.e., the limited 
partnership, the purchase of the ranch, and the option back to Colman 
on the ranch)" (pp. 3-4, Respondent's Brief); that Colman only agreed 
to the structure demanded by cippellants "so long as he had an oppor-
tunity to reacquire the Anderson Ranch" (p. 4, Respondent's Brief), 
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that "Appellants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on 
these representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as 
executed; and Colman did so rely and granted Appellants a deed to the 
Anderson Ranch" (p. 7, Respondent's Brief); and that "Allen consis-
tently advised anyone who asked that the parties to the Option never 
intended for Colman to pay the $5,000.00" (p. 7, Respondent's Brief). 
Without multiplying examples, examination of Respondent's record cita-
tions in support of these propositions demonstrates that the vast 
majority of the material cited does not even reference the subject 
I 
matter of the alleged "facts", and that actual references are few and 
where not equivocal are directly contradictory of the alleged "facts". 
Appellants simply ask that the Court observe critically the 
relationship of the cited evidence to the recited "facts". As the 
illustrative examples noted above mirror actual findings by the Dis-
trict Court, examination of the supporting evidence cited by Respond-
ent will provide the Court a thumbnail view of the quality of evidence 
supporting the District Court's Judgment. 
The "Dual-Consideration" Argument 
For the proposition that "other good and valuable consideration" 
will support enforcement of the option in this case even though the 
$5,000.00 was never paid, Respondent relies upon cases that hold that 
where two considerations are agreed upon, the fact that one is inade-
quate will not defeat the agreement if the other is adequate and 
legal. See Luther v. Nat'1 Bank of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 (Wash. 
1940); U.S. v^ Schaefer, 319 F.2d 907 (9 Cir. 1963). 
The difficulty with these cases for Respondent is that they hold 
unequivocally that all legal considerations agreed upon must be de-
3 
livered, however inadequate, to preserve the agreement. See Luther, 
supra, 98 P.2d at 673, citing Williston on Contracts. They do not 
support the proposition wished for by Respondent that where two con-
siderations are agreed upon, delivery of one will suffice. 
In any case, no witness in this matter intimated that there were 
two considerations for the subject option: one said the phrase 
"$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration" was "short-hand" 
for something else; three said it meant $5,000.00. No one claimed 
that $5,000.00 was an illegal or inadequate consideration. 
The answer to Respondent's claim about "dual consideration", 
therefore, is that the option did not provide for a dual considera-
tion; even if it had, the cases relied upon by Respondent would re-
quire the delivery of both, the $5,000.00 and whatever else might be 
thought to have been agreed upon. 
The "Promissory Estoppel" Argument 
The law of Utah is simply that an acknowledgment of receipt does 
not prevent a showing that, in fact, the consideration was not paid. 
Nielsen v^ MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah, 1982); FMA Financial 
Corp. v^ Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah, 1980). Such an 
acknowledgment is not a promise upon which an estoppel may be based. 
Moreover, it is admitted in this case that there was no reliance 
on any such promise. Appellants admittedly warned Colman repeatedly 
from the date the $5,000.00 was first due up to the date for exercise 
of the option that the $5,000.00 had not been paid and that the option 
was considered invalid as a result. Respondent chose to rely upon a 
claim of Colman's lawyer that the $5,000.00 did not have to be paid. 
It is absurd to suggest that Respondent relied to his detriment on a 
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representation of appellants that the $5,000.00 had been paid. 
The Parol Evidence Problem 
The indisputable, and undisputed, facts in this case include: 
1. the subject documents; 
2. the fact that appellants required the transactions to be 
structured as shown by the documents, for legitimate and important tax 
reasons, and would not have entered into the transactions otherwise; 
specifically, that appellants refused to consumate the transactions as 
a secured loan; and 
3. that the $5,000.00 recited as consideration for the option 
was never paid. 
The subject documents show on their face that: 
cO on October 15, 1981, appellants John Archer and Elliott 
Wolfe entered into a limited partnership agreement with Owanah Oil 
Company, represented by William Colman, in which Archer and Wolfe gave 
$250,000.00 in return for certain royalties and a promise to expend 
the money in a manner permitting tax credits; 
b) on November 9, 1981, appellants John and Elizabeth Archer, 
the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, and the Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701 
agreed to purchase from Royalty Investment Company, represented by 
Colman, the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00; and 
c) as of "March , 1982", Mr. and Mrs. Archer and Elliott 
Wolfe signed an option, for "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable 
consideration", to William Colman to purchase the Anderson Ranch for 
$650,000.00 on or before July 2, 1984. 
Respondent, based upon the testimony of Frank Allen, claims that, 
despite the face of the documents, the "real" arrangement between 
5 
appellants and Colman was that appellants would provide Colman 
$500,000,00, Colman would give appellants a deed to the Anderson 
Ranch, and Colman, without further consideration, would obtain a right 
to get the ranch back after 1% years by repaying appellants the 
$500,000.00 plus 20% interest. Notwithstanding Respondent's present 
denial, his claim throughout this matter has been nothing more or less 
than that the transaction between appellants and Colman was a loan 
secured by the Anderson Ranch, and that Colman had the right to redeem 
the security by repaying the loan. 
The reason for Respondent's present denial of the claim announced 
in his opening statement and pursued throughout the trial is that, in 
post-trial memoranda, Respondent discovered that, as an exception to 
the parol evidence rule, the claim that documents on their face an 
absolute sale are in fact a secured loan must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, including evidence that both parties regarded the 
transaction as a loan. The record in this case is simply devoid of 
any evidence that appellants ever thought their arrangements with 
Colman a loan, or that they thought Colman had a right to retrieve the 
ranch without exercise of the Option, or that they indicated at any 
time that the $5,000.00 was not collectible, or that anyone in the 
course of the subject transactions ever suggested that "$5,000.00 and 
other good and valuable consideration" in the Option meant anything 
but $5,000.00. Realizing that the evidence in this case does not 
begin to meet the applicable standard, Respondent now denies that the 
basis of the ruling is a claim that the subject transaction was a 
secured loan. Respondent fails to note that the same evidentiary 
requirements would apply, whatever his theory, since this is an action 
for specific performance of an oral agreement. 
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Respondent now attempts instead to show that the District Courtfs 
reliance on parol evidence was justified as a search for the "real 
consideration" for the option. 
"Real" Cons iderat ion 
Where the consideration is not stated in an agreement - either 
because no mention is made of consideration or because the language 
used is a "mere receipt" - the law allows resort to parol to show that 
something of value which passes between the parties contemporaneously 
is the consideration. See Neilsen v. MFT Leasing, supra.; Wood v. 
Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1978). Resort to parol to explain con-
sideration, however, is not allowed where a contractual exchange of 
one thing for another is stated. E.g. Paccagnini v. Bort, 190 N.E. 2d 
493 (111. App. 1963): Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah, 1941). In 
the latter case, neither side is permitted to claim that it should 
give less than is stated, or should receive more. Therefore, where a 
search for consideration outside the terms of a document is allowed, 
it may not be made among the terms of another document which states a 
simple contractual exchange of one thing for another. 
The real estate purchase agreement and the limited partnership 
agreement in this case are simple contractual exchanges. Their terms 
as to consideration cannot be altered by resort to parol evidence. 
The District Court's reliance upon parol evidence in this case cannot 
be excused on the theory that it was appropriate to explain that the 
consideration for the real estate contract and certificate of limited 
partnership, despite their plain written terms, also included the 
option. 
Respondent's glib claim that the option, the real estate con-
7 
tract, and the certificate of limited partnership contain "mutual, 
overlapping considerations" improperly ignores the plain fact that the 
real estate contract and the limited partnership agreement consist of 
1 for 1 contractual exchanges which are exclusive of other considera-
tions and contain nothing extra which could "overlap". 
Integration 
Respondent claims that the real estate contract, limited partner-
ship agreement, and option may be regarded as "integrated", and, 
therefore, that consideration for the option can be found in the real 
estate contract and the limited partnership agreement. Respondent 
neglects the fact that there is no basis in this record for "integrat-
ing" these documents except the theory argued throughout that, taken 
together, they constitute a secured loan. 
A claim of "integration" in any case does not justify altering 
the legal effect of the documents or altering contractual provisions 
regarding consideration. It cannot be denied that unless the option 
in this case is regarded as separately bargained cind paid for, as it 
appears on its face, and the limited partnership cigreement is regardec 
as an exchange of funds for valuable royalties and controlled expendi-
tures, as it appears on its face, the result is to undo the tax 
affects which all witnesses agree were the specific and exclusive 
basis on which appellants agreed to enter into the subject 
transactions. 
Respondent also suggests a variant of the "integration1 claim as 
a ground for a parol finding of consideration in this case, namely, 
that consideration can be found where the option is reserved as a 
condition of the sale of realty. In support of this claim, Respondenl 
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cites statements in American Jurisprudence 2d and an Illinois case 
which indicate that where a buyer of land is promised by the seller 
that the seller will later repurchase the land at buyerf s option, 
buyer can enforce the option (77 Am. Jur. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, 
§48; Gerald Elbin v. Seegren, 378 N.E.2d 626 (111. 1978); and see 
Tilton v. Sterling Coal £ Coke Co., 77 P.758 (Utah, 1904) for dicta 
regarding a lessee)), and a Nebraska case which finds that where there 
are ample separate payments not otherwise accounted for and it is 
shown that the land would not have been sold without the option, 
consideration may be found for the option. Commuter Development and 
Investment v. Granlich, 279 N.W.2d 394 (Neb. 1979). 
Again, except for Respondent's assumption that the transactions 
were a loan, there simply is no evidence in this case that Colman would 
not have sold the land without an option back, or that appellants would 
have agreed to provide the option except for the promise of $5,000.00. 
The "Notes" 
Respondent's Brief does not contain an argument why the "notes", 
Exhibits "54", "55", and "56", should have been admitted under Rule 
106, U.R.C.P., except that Respondent wanted them admitted and claimed 
he had nothing more than fragments to offer. Of course, it cannot be 
a response to the requirement of Rule 106 that whole texts be offered 
where necessary to make them clear and not misleading merely that the 
proponent claims he does not possess the whole text. Such a claim 
simply aborts the rule. 
The fact is that the fragments offered by Respondent were incom-
plete in critical places, and essentially unintelligible. Respond-
ents' Brief does not really seem to dispute this. Respondent attempt-
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ed to draw from them, and attempts in his Brief again to draw from 
them, statements which they do not in any clear or complete fashion 
contain. The unreliable and misleading character of the documents 
could not be better demonstrated than by producing them. They are, 
accordingly, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
The District Court clearly relied upon these documents for the 
sort of conclusions sought by Respondent, and used them to determine 
the credibility of a central witness, William Colman. This was clear-
ly error, and as it clearly affected the outcome, clearly reversible. 
The Appraisal 
It was critical to Respondent's case to show that the Anderson 
Ranch had a value of $500,000.00 in Fall, 1981. The only evidence on 
this point offered by Respondent, and the evidence specifically relied 
upon by the District Court, was a 1971 appraisal which admittedly was 
based upon a fundamental misconception that the property was zoned 
permissively for development when it was, in fact, zoned restrictive^ 
against development. 
Respondent now coyly attempts to explain away this difficulty by 
describing the appraisal as one "assuming zoning approval for develop-
ment". There is nothing in the appraisal that suggests such a con-
struction. It is simply in error about the zoning. There was no 
evidence that any zoning change had ever been sought, or was pending, 
or could be. The uncontradicted evidence was that the appraisal 
simply appraised the wrong property. 
The Marcellus Palmer appraisal was not an appraisal of the Ander-
son Ranch which exists, but of a property which the District Court 
knew did not exist. Nevertheless, the District Court specifically 
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relied upon the appriasal as the basis for a finding critical to the 
judgment. This finding must be stricken, with the result that the 
judgment must be reversed. 
The Evidentiary Requirement 
This is an action for specific performance. The agreement to be 
specifically performed, however, is not that which appears from the 
documents in evidence, namely, that Colman, for $5,000.00, would have 
an option on the Anderson Ranch, but a different agreement, namely, 
that Colman should have the option without paying the $5,000.00. The 
latter agreement is merely oral, and is found in the "integration" of 
the real estate contract, the limited partnership agreement, and the 
option on the theory that they were really a secured loan. That is, 
exercise of the option was merely redemption of the security upon 
repayment of the loan, and borrower should not be required to pay 
separately for the right to redeem. 
In an action for specific performance of an oral agreement, or on 
a claim that an outright conveyance is in fact security for a loan, 
plaintiff must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence which 
includes a clear and convincing showing that both parties to the 
transaction understood and agreed to the claimed terms. Corey v. 
Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 942, 547 (Utah, 1933); Clark v. George, 234 P.2d 
844 (Utah, 1951); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah, 
1959) . 
Respondent's present disavowal of his "loan" theory below effec-
tively admits that the evidence below does not satisfy these require-
ments. Even setting aside the objections to parol, and indulging the 
District Court's conclusion that Colman was lying, the record is 
11 
devoid of any evidence that anyone but Colman or his attorney regarded 
the transactions as a loan, or thought the $5,000.00 for the option 
need not be paid. The evidence that Colman thought such things is 
merely negative, and Frank Allen's conclusions about the nature of the 
transactions are wholly unsupported by evidence that he heard or 
observed anything on the part of appellants inconsistent with their 
belief that the transactions were structured exactly as they appear on 
their face for real and serious tax purposes. Allen, in fact, made no 
other claim in the latter regard than that he didn't credit appel-
lants1 tax purposes because he didn't understand them. 
Respondent asks the Court to read Allen's testimony carefully. 
Appellants heartily support this request. In addition to a remarkable 
tendency toward inuendo and to denominate what was obviously recon-
struction and speculation with the phrase "recollection", the Court 
should observe that Mr. Allen admits that he was not privy to negotia-
tion of the documents (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 43, 93-95), admits that he made 
no effort to discern appellant's purposes (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 94-95), 
admits that the "instructions" from which he drew his conclusions 
about the transactions came from Colman not from appellants (Tr. Vol. 
1, pp. 44-45, 49, 63) (with the exception of fixing the closing date 
for the land sale and extending the operative date of the option, for 
purposes entirely consistent with appellants' testimony) (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 61-62), admits that he never discussed the $5,000.00 consideration 
for the option with anyone (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-155), and testified 
in direct contradiction of himself on the central issues of date of 
execution of the option (compare Tr. Vol. I, p. 137 with Tr. Vol. II, 
pp. 170-176), and independent value of the limited partnership inter-
ests (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 121-123). 
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When Allen's testimony is considered together with the facts that 
the District Court's rationale for disbelief of Colman was the inad-
missible "notes", and its only evidence of a value of the Anderson 
Ranch consistent with Respondent's claims was an admittedly inaccurate 
appraisal, it seems obvious that the evidence in this case supporting 
the judgment is not clear and convincing, and does not include any-
thing tending to indicate that appellants ever regarded the option as 
a free component of a loan. 
Conclusion 
The District Court apparently thought it unfortunate that, having 
paid $250,000.00 for a property now apparently worth in excess of 
$650,000.00, appellants should get to keep the land because of the 
"technicality" of failure to pay $5,000.00 for the option. The pre-
sent judgment is the result. 
Appellants may not be denied enforcement of the documents as 
written because a bargain eminently fair on its face when made should 
appear inequitable in changed economic circumstances years later. Had 
equities been in issue, much might have been presented by appellants 
on the inequity of now construing the documents in a manner which 
exposes appellants to loss of the tax benefits they bargained for. 
No sound evidentiary basis was provided for the District Court's 
judgment declining to enforce the documents as written, and instead 
enforcing a bargain which all parties to it denied existed. The 
judgment below must be reversed. 
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